We studied dual-channel supply chains using centralized and decentralized decision-making models. We also conducted a comparative analysis of the decisions before and after demand disruption. The study shows that the amount of change in decision-making is a linear function of the amount of demand disruption, and it is independent of the risk-averse coefficient. The optimal sales volume decision of the disturbing supply chain is related to market share and demand disruption in the decentralized decision-making model.
Introduction
More vendors, such as IBM and NIKE, were began to open direct selling channels beyond the traditional sales channels. They combined online and offline channels to expand their sales market penetration. Dual-channel supply chain has become a major type of supply chain.
This model has certain advantages, but many challenges also exist. The supply-demand relationship and competition relationship will coexist between the supplier and retailer after an online direct marketing channel opens. Competition may also lead to conflicts between the two channels in terms of cross-channel price and operation. Supply chain decision-makers face certain risks in actual operation, specifically when the external environment of the dual-channel competitive market. Tsay and Agrawal [7] found a reasonable pricing strategy that introduced the online direct selling channel by comparing three models, namely, traditional distribution channel, direct online channel, and a third channel that combines traditional distribution and direct selling; this strategy does not have a negative effect on the supplier's benefits in the traditional distribution channels. By analyzing and comparing dual-channel supply chain pricing under different power structures, Zhang et al. [8] proved the existence of different pricing on the supply chain as a result of different power structures.
Several scholars combined the factors of a dual-channel supply chain, such as market demand, price, service, advertising, lead time, and fairness concerns, to study its pricing strategy [9] [10] [11] [12] . Some scholars studied a combination of multiple factors. Yao and Liu [13] estimated two models in a dual-channel supply chain; one model for Bertrand competition between suppliers and retailers, and the other model for Stackelberg competition, which is dominated by suppliers. They discussed the same product in different channels of equilibrium pricing strategy when price and service simultaneously influenced the demand.
Demand disruption will have a serious influence on the supply chain ( [14] [15] ). The collaboration between the two channels will become a necessary condition for the dual-channel supply chain to maintain stable operation. By considering the supply chain of one supplier and two competing retailers, Zhang et al. [16] considered using a revenue-sharing contract when demand disturbances occur. Xiao et al. [17] analyzed the coordination of multiple retailers competing in the supply chain during demand disturbance.
Zhang et al. [8] discussed the unexpected events in a competing supply chain of multiple retailers and investigated the establishment of a revenue-sharing contract for coordination according to demand disruption. Cao et al. [18] considered a supply chain composed of one supplier and multiple retailers that use the revenue-sharing contract to coordinate cost and demand. Ma and Xie [19] focused on the dynamic pricing game of the duopoly air conditioner market with disturbance in demand and analyzed the influence of disturbance on the dynamic game system. Chen and Zhuang [20] also discussed the management issues of demand disruption, wherein the supply chain is dominated by retailers. However, the above studies focused on traditional distribution channels. Only few studies have focused on dual-channel supply chain. Only Huang et al. [21] analyzed optimal pricing and production decision in demand disruption of a dual-channel supply chain using the centralized decision-making model and the supplier-dominated decentralized decision-making model.
Most studies assume that supply chain participants are risk-neutral, whereas some scholars showed through empirical research that not all decision-makers are risk-neutral [22] . The decision of a risk-adverse manager is different from a risk-neutral manager. Choi et al. [23] and Xiao and Choi [24] used the mean-variance theory to discuss the relationship between the decision-making of a retailer with risk characteristic and the expected profit and variance. Xu et al. [25] established the mean-variance model for risk-averse dual-channel supply chain and assumed that the pricing of a risk-averse channel is lower than a risk-neutral one. Liu et al. [26] studied the effect of risk aversion on the optimal policies of a dual-channel supply chain under complete and asymmetric information cases. However, these studies did not consider dual-channel supply chain in demand disruption.
By taking a wider perspective of the present research situation, domestic and foreign scholars gave more attention to the unexpected events in the supply chain in the recent years and achieved different results. Few studies have integrated dual-channel supply chain, demand disruption, and risk-averse. Thus, further exploration can be conducted in this field.
Model Descriptions
This paper considers a dual-channel supply chain involving one supplier and one retailer, which is illustrated in Figure 1 . Among the supply chain, the supplier owns two channels, one of which is the traditional distribution channel and the other is the direct one. While, the retailer has only one channel. The potential scale of market demand is ɶ a a ε = + , where ε The cost of production is c , and the product is sold to the retailer at the wholesale price w and directly to the customer at the direct sale price d p . The retailer sells commodity to customers at the retail price r p . The normal situation is in which the supplier and the retailer formulate production plans according to historical data and market forecasts. The fluctuation of market demand during disasters is discussed, as well as its influences on the decisions of supply chain members.
The model is solved based on the following assumptions:
(1) The productions we considered in the supply chain are single period.
(2) The retailer can only purchase goods from the supplier at the wholesale price. (4) In order to simplify the calculation, and the analysis results will not be effected, we make selling cost, logistics cost, service cost et al. are zero.
(5) The situation of free ride will not be considered.
(6) Supplier undertakes the losses caused by the demand fluctuations of the system.
(7) Decision is effected by market demand more than the risk attitude of the decision-maker.
In the following further discussion, let symbol " * "be the optimal strategy of a supply chain in a centralized decision-making model before the demand disruption while symbol " ' " be the one after the demand disruption. Let symbol "× " be the optimal strategy of a supply chain manager, which is dominated by supplier in a decentralized decision-making model before the demand disruption while symbol " " be the one after the demand disruption.
Dual-channel Supply Chain in the Centralized Decision-making Model
As supplier and retailer act as a whole in the centralized decision-making model, they make unified planning on the goal of maximizing the system's profit. The situation that a supplier or a retailer makes decision individually doesn't exist.
Similar to the study of Huang et al. [21] , the market demands of both traditional and direct sale channels are assumed to be the linear function of price.
( )
Subscripts r and d represent the traditional and direct sale channels respectively, a is the potential market demand, ρ is the market share of the direct sale channel, and 1 α and 2 α are the individual price effects of the two channels. The supply chain in this study exhibits information symmetry, thus the cross-price effects of the two channels are assumed as β . As usual, the demand of each channel is more affected by their individual prices than by the cross prices. Therefore, 1
The total demand of the two channels is
Centralized Decision without Demand Disruption
At no demand disruption, the supplier plans based on historical data and market forecasts. The expected profit of the entire supply chain is expressed as
The variance of the expected profit of the entire supply chain is
Risk-aversive behavior has been widely studied. We adopted the mean-variance model in the present study to measure expected utility by referring to the classical mean-variance criterion introduced by Markowitz [27] and the study conducted by Bannister et al. [28] . The object function is
By substitution of Equations (1), (2) 
Decision with Demand Disruption
When emergencies occur, market size is disrupted, and its potential demand changes from a to a a + ∆ , a ∆ is the demand disturbance caused by the disaster. Fluctuation in relation to market size is assumed to not eliminate the demand for the product, that is,
When the market is disrupted, the demands of the traditional and direct sale channels are
Following the disruption, the total demand is calculated as
If the actual demand is smaller than the planned output, handling costs would be incurred, whereas if the actual demand is larger, a shortage would be experienced. These assumptions are the same as those of Huang et al. [21] . The handling cost factor is denoted as 1 u , and the shortage cost factor is 2 u . The expected profit of the supply chain under centralization and after the demand disruption is
In Equation (10), ( ) max{0, } x x + = . The first and second part represents the profit of traditional distribution and direct selling channel after the demand disruption respectively.
The third part represents the handling cost when market demand is larger than original planning production after the demand disruption. The fourth part represents the shortage cost when market demand is smaller than original planning production after the demand disruption. As a matter of fact, handling cost and shortage cost don't happen at the same time.
It has been proved that when 0
[21], it will not be discussed once more.
In this situation, the variance of the expected profit of the supply chain is
The expected utility function of the supply chain is
. . ' conditions for Equation (13) are the following:
In this situation, the variance of the expected profit of the supply chain is 
The expected utility of the supply chain is
. . '
Similar to Situation 1, identifying the following suitable KKT conditions for Equation
The influence of the market size on decisions is also hypothesized to be more than that of risk attitude. Therefore, 0 a a kσ
By solving Equations (14) and (18) and combined with Equations (7), (8) and (9), Theorem 2 will be achieved.
Theorem 2
When demand is disrupted, the optimum pricing, the optimum sales volume, and the corresponding optimum output of the supply chain under centralization are:
Theorem 2 shows that demand disturbance will change the optimal pricing, optimal sales, and corresponding optimum output in the supply chain. After obtaining the derivation calculus to risk adverse coefficient k , the relationship between the first derivative and 0 can be easily judged. Conclusion 1 can be easily obtained by combining the relationship between the correlated variables and k with Theorem 1.
Conclusion 1
The pricing strategy and coefficient of risk aversion are inversely proportional before and after demand disruption. The optimum sales volume and optimum total production are proportional to the risk adverse coefficient. The risk aversion attitude toward the supply chain affects the system's optimum strategy in the same manner before and after demand disruption.
Conclusion 1 indicates that regardless of the presence or absence of demand disruption, the price decision of the supply chain decreases with increased coefficient of risk aversion of the supply chain, that is, the more the supply chain avoids risk, the lower the channel price will be. Optimum output increases with the increase in the coefficient of risk aversion. The more the supply chain is afraid of risk, the larger the optimum output will be. The same principle applies to the situation without demand disruption. Conclusion 1 can correct the decision to provide theoretical guidance for the optimum price and optimum output based on the risk aversion of the supply chain under any circumstance.
Strategy comparison before and after demand disruption
Theorem 3 can be obtained based on the optimum price before and after demand disruption, which was obtained from Theorems 1 and 2.
Theorem 3
The variation relationship between the optimum direct selling price and optimum retail price of the dual-channel supply chain under centralization before and after the demand disruption is ( ( 2 ) , ( 2 ) ) u u α α β α α β − + − + − , the price that will be adjusted can be regarded as a new market, wherein market size is a ∆ and the marginal cost of production is 0. When
, the price that will be adjusted can be regarded as a new market, wherein market size is a ∆ and the marginal cost of production is
Theorem 4 can be obtained based on the optimum selling volume of the two channels under centralization before and after the demand disruption obtained from Theorems 1 and 2.
Theorem 4
The variation relationship of the optimum sales volume of the dual-channel supply chain under centralization before and after the demand disruption is ( ( 2 ) , ( 2 ) ) u u α α β α α β − + − + − , the sales volume that will be adjusted can be regarded as a new market, wherein the market size is a ∆ and the marginal cost of production is 0. When ( ( 2 ) , ( 2 ) This observation is proven in Appendix 1.
Proposition 1 shows that when the demand disruption is beyond the robust interval, the larger the market share of the channel is, the less stable and the more likely that it will be affected by the environment. The two channels have the same stability when demand disruption is within the robust interval. Stability is relevant to the market share of every distribution selling channel.
The variation relationship of the optimum output of the whole supply chain under centralization before and after the demand disruption can be obtained as Theorem 5 combined with Theorems 1 and 2.
Theorem 5
The variation relationship of the optimum output under centralization before and after the demand disruption is ( ( 2 ) , ( 2 ) ) u u α α β α α β − + − + − , the original optimum output shows robustness. This equation also means that the supply chain only need to adjust the price and selling decision of the two channels but not the production quantity under centralization. When the demand fluctuation is beyond the range, the supply chain system needs to adjust production quantity, price and selling strategy at the same time. When
, the sales volume that will be adjusted can be regarded as a new market, wherein the market size is a ∆ and the marginal cost of production is 1 u or 2 u − .
Conclusion 2 can be obtained from Theorems 3, 4, and 5.
Conclusion 2
Demand disruption can change the optimum price and optimum sales strategy in two channels. These supply chain strategies need to be adjusted no matter how big the scale of the demand disruption is. However, it can be obtained through a linear function of a ∆ based on the original strategy, which is not relevant to k . A robust interval exists
( ( 2 ) , ( 2 ) ) u u α α β α α β − + − + − , which shows robusticity in the optimum output in the system. When the scale of the demand disruption is beyond the range, the optimum output should be adjusted. However, it is only relevant to disturbance quantity a ∆ , and not to risk-averse coefficient k .
Dual-channel Supply Chain Decisions in the Decentralized Decision-making Model
Under decentralization, the supplier, as the Stackelberg leader, initially decides on the optimum direct selling price and the optimum wholesale price, according to his/her knowledge about the market and from the retailer, which are based on the principle to maximize profit. The retailer then decides the optimum retail price according to the wholesale price decided by the supplier, which is based also on the principle of profit maximization.
The backward induction is conducted in to solve the problem.
Decentralized Decision without Demand Disruption
In the stable market condition, the market demand function of the two channels is as
Equations (1) and (2). The optimum output of the supply chain system is as Equation (3).
The expected profits of the supplier and retailer under decentralization are
Calculate the decision making of retailer firstly. As the retailer is risk-neutral, the utility function of the retailer is the same as the expected profit function. The reaction function of the optimum retail price could be solved by maximizing Equation (20) . 
Combine Equations (19) and (20) , the variance of the expected profit of the supplier is With the Lagrange multiplier 0 λ ≥ , the KKT conditions are
Theorem 6 could be obtained by solving Equation (24) and combining Equation (21) .
Theorem 6
In a dual-channel supply chain under decentralization without demand disruption, the optimum direct selling price and the optimum wholesale price for the supplier and the optimum retail price for the retailer are defined as follows: Similar to the actual conditions under decentralization, the price will decrease when the direct sale channel has a relatively small market share, thereby attracting customers. However, the minimum price will not be lower than the distribution price. When the direct sale channel has a relatively large market share, the price in the distribution channel will decrease, which will capture the market. Consequently, the direct selling price will be higher than the distribution price.
Theorem 7 can be obtained by combining Theorem 6, Equations (1), (2) and (3).
Theorem 7
The optimum sales volume and optimum output of the two channels under decentralization without demand disruption are
The first derivative of risk aversion coefficient s k of the optimum decision in Theorems 6 and 7 is calculated.
Theorems 6 and 7 illustrate that the price decisions and expected profits of members in a dual-channel supply chain under decentralization are related to market share ρ . When ρ fluctuates in different intervals, the strategies of the supply chain will also differ. Thus, to make an appropriate decision, a manager should consider the internal and external environment and assess market distribution.
Decentralized Decision with Demand Disruption
With the assumption that under decentralization, the fluctuation of market size is a common knowledge to the supplier and retailer, the market demands for the two channels under demand disruption are 
The total demand after the disruption is 
The expected profit functions of the supplier included treatment cost factor 1 u and stock out cost factor 2 u after the disruption is
The first part of Equation (29) represents the profit of supplier in traditional distribution channel. The second part represents the profit of supplier in online direct selling channel.
The third part represents the loss of stock out when demand is larger than original production after disruption. The fourth part represents the treatment cost when demand is smaller than original production after disruption.
Backward induction is used to solve the problem. In the second phase of the Stackelberg game, the retailer maximizes Equation (28) 
In the first phase of the Stackelberg game, the supplier sets the optimum wholesale price and the optimum direct selling price to maximize his/her own profit.
Situation 1: When 0 a ∆ > , that is, the actual demand is more than the planned output, the supplier must pay for the shortage cost. The function of the supplier's expected profit is
Combined with Equation (30), the variance of the supplier's expected profit is 
The utility function of the supplier is 
Situation 2: When 0 a ∆ < , that is, the actual demand is less than the planned output, the supplier must pay for the handling cost. The function and variance of the expected profit of the supplier are
The utility function of the supplier is
Similar to Equation (34), the KKT conditions are [ ] 
[ ]
Theorem 9 reveals that the demand and the disruption volume of a dual-channel supply chain under decentralization are related to the market shares of the different channels when market demand disruption occurs. The different market share of the two channels will lead to different demands under the given demand disruption. When the market share of the two channels is the same, the demand of each channel is different because of the different scales of demand disruption. The optimum output of the whole supply chain is also affected by the scale of demand disruption. When a ∆ fluctuates within the range of ( )
, u u ψ ψ − , the optimum decisions are the same for the dual-channel supply chain. When a ∆ is beyond the specified range, the optimum decisions are different.
By solving the first derivative of the risk aversion coefficient s k in price, sales volume and total output of the system in Theorems 8 and 9, it is easy to determine that the first derivatives of the risk aversion coefficient of price are all less than 0. The first derivatives of the risk aversion coefficient of sales volume are all higher than 0. Conclusion 3 can be obtained by combining the variables in Theorems 6 and 7 and the relationship of s k .
Conclusion 3
Regardless of the market share of the two channels and the degree of demand disruption, the higher the risk aversion coefficient of supplier is, the lower the price is. The relationship between the optimum sales volume and optimum total output is opposite to the risk aversion coefficient of supplier.
The Comparison of Decision before and after the Disruption
Theorem 10 can be obtained by combining Theorems 7 and 9 and comparing the relationship of the two channels' sales volume before and after the disruption.
Theorem 10
The relationship between the two channels' sales volume in a dual-channel supply chain which is led by supplier before and after the demand disruption is [ ]
[ ] 
According to Theorem 10, the adjusting output of the two channels is a linear function of a ∆ in the same scale of disruption and market share. However, their sales volume is different as the change rate of a ∆ is different. By comparing the pricing strategy of the supply chain before and after the demand disruption, the relationship between the pricing strategy and variable without disruption is also found to be a linear function of a ∆ . More details regarding it will not be shown because of the limited paragraph. The proof can be seen in Appendix 2.
Theorem 11 can be obtained according to the optimum output of the supply chain system in two conditions from Theorems 7 and 9.
Theorem 11
The relationship between the optimum output after the disruption and the original output before the disruption is
is the robust point interval of the optimum output under decentralization. When the demand is within this range, the supply system does not need to adjust to the production plan. When the demand is beyond this range, the supply chain should be changed. When 
Numerical Analysis

Dual-channel Supply Chain Decisions in a Centralized Decision-making Model
Based on relevant literature [see 6, 7, 24, 25] , the parameters of the model are consistent with the model consumptions. In this study, we set ɶ (1) Effects of a ∆ and k on the decision-making variables under centralized decision
We set 25, 10, 0,10, 25 a ∆ = − − to ensure that market demand disruption is within and outside the robust region. We can then conclude on the relationship among optimal price, optimal sales volume within two channels, and risk aversion coefficient under stable and perturbation environments. Our conclusion is based on other data in the supply chain, as shown in Figure 2 (the range of different variables is adjusted to easily distinguish the line in the figure) . 0 a ∆ = denotes the value of each variable in a stable environment. As shown in Theorem 5 and Conclusion 2, Figure 3 indicates that the optimal production volume is robust in the centralized decision-making system. When the demand disruption scale is within the robust range ( 12,12) − , the optimal total production is equal to the production without disruption. High market demand results in high optimal output outside the robust range. Regardless of demand disruption, the optimal output has a positive correlation with the risk aversion coefficient, which is consistent with Conclusion 1.
Dual-channel Supply Chain Decisions in the Decentralized Decision-making Model
Similar to the preceding condition, we set ɶ (1) Effects of a ∆ and s k on the decision-making variables under decentralized decision
We set 25, 10, 0,10, 25 a ∆ = − − to ensure that market demand disruption is within and outside the robust region. We can then obtain the relationship among optimal price, optimal sales volume within two channels, and risk aversion coefficient under stable and perturbation environments based on the simulation data, as shown in Figure 4 . Under the same risk aversion coefficient, the higher the market demand is, the greater the prices in the two channels and the sales volume in the distribution channel are. This finding is consistent with reality. Figure 4 also indicates that the demand for online direct sales channels when 10 a ∆ = ± is close to the demand when 0 a ∆ = . This finding means that the optimal sales in the perturbation environment is close to the optimal sales in the stable environment when the sales volume in the direct channels accounts for 40% and the market demand disruption is in the robust range.
(2) Effects of a ∆ and s k on the optimal output under decentralized decision
The simulation data are substituted into the optimal total output obtained by supply chain under demand disruption. When the intensity of the disturbance is within the robust range ( 40 3, 40 3) − , the optimal output in the perturbation environment is similar to that in the stable environment. The optimal output needs should be adjusted based on that in the stable environment when disturbance intensity is beyond the robust range. When market demand disruption is higher than the upper limit of the robust region 40 3 , the optimal output is higher than the original output. The optimal output is smaller than the original output when the market demand is less than the lower limit of the robust region 40 3 − .
Great disturbance intensity leads to high output that needs to be adjusted. This finding is consistent with Theorem 11. Figure 5 shows that great risk aversion coefficient of the supplier results in optimal total output of the supply chain under the same market demand disruption. This finding is consistent with Conclusion 3. The optimal total output is positively related to the risk aversion coefficient, which means that high optimal output is obtained when the leader significantly avoids risk.
Conclusions
This paper considers two supply chains based on previous research, namely, risk-averse dual-channel supply chain under centralization and dual-channel supply chain under decentralization with a risk-averse supplier. The optimum price and production decisions of the supply chain with and without demand disruption are discussed. The influences of risk-averse attitude, channel structure, and scale of the demand disruption on supply chain decisions are also examined.
Innovatively, this paper considers the optimum strategy and provides a simple determination method of a risk-averse dual-channel supply chain before and after demand disruption. This method includes the addition of the linear function of demand disruption based on the optimum strategy without disruption to avoid the effect of risk aversion coefficient. This study suggests the robust interval of the optimum output in two strategies.
The system should adjust the production plan when the demand disruption is within the range.
This study also considers the effect of demand disruption to the sales volume of a risk-averse dual-channel supply chain and emphasizes on the stability of the two channels when disrupted. This finding is beneficial for managers because they can adjust the sales volume of the two channels of the current situation and avoid the situation wherein demand exceeds supply or supply exceeds demand. This research can supplement previous research and can provide specific academic significance and actual value. However, this paper has particular limitations. For example, the situation in which the market size has less influence on decisions than on risk attitude is not considered. Moreover, the effect of market scale is assumed to be stronger than the attitude of risk when making a decision. Thus, the detailed factors that have been ignored have simplified the current research and could be the prospective subjects for study.
, 1 3 θ θ = .
So the lager the market share of the traditional distribution channel and the scale of demand disruption are, the worse the stability is. On the contrary, the smaller the market share of the traditional distribution channel is and the larger the scale of demand disruption is, the better the stability is. For convenient analysis, we assume that the price effect of the online direct selling channel is greater than that of the traditional distribution channel. That is, When the market share of the online direct selling channel is 0 ρ ρ * < < , its stability is stronger than the traditional distribution channel. When 0 ρ ρ ρ * < < , the result is opposite.
When ρ ρ * = , the two channel have the same stability. 
